LOOKING FOR THE RAISON D'ÊTRE:
FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS NEED A NEW START

by
Martin Koopmann

On January 22, 2003, France and Germany celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in the splendid setting of the Château of Versailles. This place represents like no other the Franco-German history of war and peace. And those who could not comprehend the allusion to the events of 1871 and 1919 were at least reminded of the signing of the Franco-German Treaty in the Elysée Palace. Versailles 2003-a traditional, bilateral event, justified by forty years of productive cooperation with a considerable value added for Europe, and legitimized, furthermore, by a recent series of common initiatives for Europe and - ex post - by a stable front against American unilateralism during the Iraq conflict in the role of the advocate of the all-European public opinion. Was this the Franco-German partnership at its best?

The answer turns out to be mixed. Let us take a short look back. Since the end of the Second World War, France's reconciliation with its former enemy and its control of its new European partner represented two very constructive sides of the same coin. Franco-German initiatives for the great European projects always legitimated anew the special relationship between Paris and Bonn: from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Economic Community, the European Monetary System, the Euro, and, finally, Political Union. These projects were hardly ever based on the same interests. On the contrary: it was the fear of the supposed Sonderwege of its German partner that was France's central motive for the strategy of binding and controlling it through European integration. It was not by accident that the European Monetary Union received the decisive Franco-German stimuli by 1989/90, when the unification of the two German states became apparent.

But on the European level, in particular, the recent results of the Franco-German "motor" are not very convincing. Until autumn 2002, Paris and Berlin remained silent about the enormous challenge of the eastern enlargement of the EU, and talk of the end of the motor was on everyone's lips. It was only when enlargement was seriously threatened by the problem of the common agriculture policy (CAP) that France and Germany formulated a series of common initiatives, which, as in the important case of agriculture, were crucial to the success of the negotiations with the candidate states. Nevertheless, the bilateral CAP compromise had nothing to do with a plan for a sustainable reform of CAP, which could be a new basis for the EU's agriculture policy and a policy position for the WTO negotiations of the Doha Round. This lack of sustainability is also characteristic of the other bilateral initiatives that contain several interesting approaches but suffer from a central problem: they do not really outline a common European project, which is the key challenge of the largest and most difficult enlargement in the history of European integration. Rather, they seem to be the only possible common denominator of two states, which, in fact, have quite different ideas regarding the further development of the EU.

Consequently, severe dangers for the Franco-German acquis bilatéral can be observed: if Paris and Berlin do not succeed in defining common and long-term objectives for the benefit of Europe, in this way reproducing the glue of their partnership, the consequence could be the erosion of the bilateral capital that has accumulated over decades of cooperation. Different interests could lead increasingly to arguments and bilateral conflicts in the framework of the Union and hamper the process of integration instead of promoting it. This would not only mean that Paris and Berlin fail in their search of a new raison d'être for their special relationship; the legitimacy of this relationship, accepted generally by their European partners at the moment, would also be called into question. A vicious circle would be created, damaging both the Franco-German motor and Europe. A strange contrast to this insufficient capacity of building consensus is the frequently quoted Paris-Berlin "axis" during the Iraq conflict. At last, in foreign and security policy, France and Germany seemed to take up a common position in a central field of European politics. The fact that, at the same time, both stood up for a European Security and Defense Union (ESDU) reinforced the impression of new bilateral dynamism.

But how far does this new sense of community reach? The Franco-German axis in foreign and security policy is fragile, if it exists at all. It suffers from two major shortcomings. On the one hand, it is not the result of a common concept of foreign and security policy. France's pretense of global power projection with the help of an autonomous "Europe puissance," free of transatlantic constraints and capable of acting in and outside Europe is in stark contrast to the basics of German foreign policy, which set great store in the prevention of conflicts by civil means and in avoiding a duplication of structures between EU and NATO.

On the other hand, even the sensible ideas of the ESDU proposal are weakened by the fact that they cannot be separated-chronologically or otherwise-from the context of the row between both "old" and "new" Europe and "old" Europe and the United States. Any policy that seems to undermine the American security guarantee for Europe is doomed to failure in the EU if it is meant to serve as a basis for a common foreign policy. Yet it is obvious that only in cooperation with the United States will Europe have a maximum of security, although cooperation does not mean the absence of mutual criticism of concepts and methods. At least Berlin would not be able to maintain a long-term confrontation with Washington. The severe conflicts between the Schröder government and the opposition during the Iraq crisis show that Germany is still looking for a coherent foreign policy strategy. In view of such new threats as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Berlin (just like Paris and the entire EU) needs a close and constructive cooperation with the United States. Only if Paris and Berlin agree on this point will they promote the foreign and security policy of the EU in a sustainable manner. At present, this seems like trying to square the circle.

Therefore the new start of the Franco-German motor cannot succeed on the basis of the events that have occurred over the past few months. Saying no to the American approach in the Iraq crisis is easy; it will be much more difficult to build up a constructive European alternative for the future. In the enlarged EU, France and Germany will be only two members out of twenty-five. Their agreement will still be necessary for European progress, but it is no longer sufficient. The special relationship between Paris and Berlin has to open up-to flexible partnerships. Constructive approaches with long-term effects will only be possible together with Great Britain (and Poland); a sustainable reform of the institutions can only succeed with the support of the smaller member states. And for Germany, the old rule is still valid: as has been the case for forty years, Berlin does not have to choose between Paris and Washington/London. Berlin as a responsible mediator between transatlantic and European-continental concepts is more important today than ever.

Dr. Martin Koopmann, whose expertise lies in German-French Relations, French and German Foreign and Security Policy, History of the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, is the Head of the DGAP Program on Franco-German Relations. He has participated in several AICGS programs on Franco-German Relations.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone.
They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.