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BEYOND IRAQ:
CHALLENGES TO THE TRANSATLANTIC
SECURITY COMMUNITY
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**INTRODUCTION:
WHAT'S UP IN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP?**

> Not long ago, a generation of young Germans who were liberated from the Nazi regime by American soldiers developed admiration of the political ideals of a nation that soon became the driving force in founding the United Nations and in carrying out the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. As a consequence, classical international law was revolutionized by limiting the sovereignty of nation-states … Should this same nation now brush aside the civilizing achievement of legally domesticating the state of nature among belligerent nations? (Habermas 2002)

> Europe's rejection of power politics, its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe's new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. (Kagan 2002)

While this paper is being written, the outcome of the Iraq crisis is unclear. However, whatever happens in the Middle East and whatever its impact on the transatlantic relationship, it is time to re-evaluate this relationship and take stock of its current evolution.[1] Of course, such an effort has to take into account that the history of the transatlantic relationship is a history of crises. Remember those books: *The Troubled Partnership* (Kissinger 1965), *Allies in Crisis* (Sherwood 1990)? Remember those times when hundred thousands of Europeans marched against Ronald Reagan and his rhetoric of "the evil empire?" Will we soon see similar crowds protesting against George W. Bush and his talk of an "axis of evil?"

If the current conflicts and mud-slinging across the Atlantic ("U.S. imperialism" vs. "European complacency") are supposed to be different from the past, we need some convincing analytical arguments pointing to structural changes in world politics rather than the editorial adhockery that prevails in newspapers and in many policy journals. Three such changes come to mind: the end of the cold war; unprecedented American preponderance of power; and September 11, 2001 and the rise of trans-national terrorism.

I argue in the following that none of these developments (alone or in combination) offer sufficient evidence to conclude that structural changes in the international system are about to spell the end of the transatlantic community as we have known it over the past fifty years. The transatlantic security community is still intact, resting on a combination of collective identity based on common values, (economic) interdependence based on common material interests, and common institutions based on norms regulating the relationship. The current conflicts stem from domestic developments on both sides of the Atlantic leading to different perceptions of contemporary security threats and, more importantly, different prescriptions for handling them. Such differences have existed before and they have been dealt with through the institutions of the transatlantic community, including the European use of domestic access opportunities into the U.S. political

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system. There is little to suggest that these transatlantic channels of mutual influence no longer work. This is the good news.

The bad news is that unilateral and even imperial tendencies in contemporary U.S. foreign policy, particularly in official discourse, violate constitutive norms on which the transatlantic security community has been based for decades, namely, multilateralism and close consultation with allies. Moreover, the more the United States acts unilaterally and renounces international agreements and institutions that it itself helped to build, the more it affects the fundamental principles of world order and the rule of (international) law in dealing with international conflicts (see the above quote by Jürgen Habermas). The current "National Security Strategy" of the U.S. (President of the United States 2002) is, indeed, partly at odds with some principles of the world order that have been part of the western consensus in the post World War II era. In this sense, the current disagreements between Europe and the United States go beyond ordinary policy conflicts and touch issues of common values.

As a result, a European response should be articulated. It is already being articulated in practice—from European efforts in conflict prevention and peacekeeping to European support for the International Criminal Court and multilateral efforts at dealing with global environmental challenges. However, the neo-conservative discourse emanating from Washington requires a European response in terms of an alternative vision of world order based on the rule of law and liberal principles. Such a response also necessitates that the Europeans, particularly the Germans, come to terms with the instruments of military power. The current transatlantic division of labor— "the U.S. bombs, the Europeans clean up"—is not sustainable in the long run.

Yet a European (counter-) vision of world order is not meant to wreck the transatlantic security community. Rather, it is meant to revive a serious transatlantic dialogue beyond the mud slinging and to (re-) create the transnational alliances across the Atlantic among like-minded groups that seem to have been silenced after 9/11.

The paper proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss the fundamentals of the transatlantic security community, including some alternative accounts. Second, I analyze domestic developments on both sides of the Atlantic in order to account for the current crisis. This part concentrates on the United States. Third, I conclude by sketching a European vision of world order in response to current discourse emanating from Washington.

THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY IN CRISIS?

Three Claims on the Contemporary Crisis in U.S.-European Relations

As stated above, three arguments can be made to support the fact that the current conflicts in the transatlantic relationship are fundamentally different from past crises. Each claim points to the effects of structural changes in the international system that then lead to changes in the western alliance.

The End of the Cold War

John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz argued more than ten years ago that the end of the cold war and the resulting end of the bipolar international system would lead to the slow decline of the western alliance (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993). This argument was straight out of the structural realist theory of international relations: alliances are partnerships of convenience and joint interest formed to balance the power of an adversary. Once the power of the adversary has collapsed, the forces that bind an alliance together decrease. NATO and the transatlantic relationship are no exceptions. Ten years after the end of the cold war, NATO is alive and (somewhat) kicking and has just accepted new members. Thus, the argument is either falsified or it is still too early to tell. Either way, structural realism of this kind seems too indeterminate to tell us much for the future of the transatlantic relationship.

U.S. Power (and European Weakness)

A second argument holds that the end of the cold war has led to an unprecedented supremacy of U.S. power in the international system (e.g., Wohlforth 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth 2002; Huntington 1999). Wohlforth, in particular, argues that U.S. unipolarity is historically unique; since American power stems from so many sources, it can last for quite a while. As a result, the United States is not likely to be subjected to the "tragedy of great power politics" (Mearsheimer 2001), namely, that imperial ambitions will sooner or later lead to the rise of a counter-alliance in a balance-of-power world. Thus, the United States no longer requires allies to pursue its goals and can go it alone. At the same time, Europe is militarily weak and its military expenditures have declined sharply after the end of the cold war. Kagan has argued in this context that the United States lives in a Hobbesian "dog-eat-dog" world and sees itself as the world policeman, while Europeans have made themselves comfortable in a Kantian world of peace and multilateralism (Kagan 2002). He concludes, "The United States and Europe are fundamentally different today." Hence the crisis in the relationship!

There are various problems and inherent contradictions with these claims. First, it is certainly true that we live in a unipolar world when it comes to military power. Concerning economic power, though, the argument only holds true if the European Union (EU) is treated as fifteen (twenty-five from 2004 on) single states rather than an economic power with a single market and a single currency (and shortly a constitution). Concerning various categories of "soft power" (knowledge, ideas; etc. Nye 1990), it is rather unclear whether the United States is in a league of its own, since "soft power" seems to be rather diffuse and more widely spread in the contemporary world system. In a Hobbesian realist world, however, it is ultimately economic power that forms the basis of military might—and not the other way round (cf. e.g. Gilpin 1981). In other words, if Europeans are currently weak in a narrow military sense, it is the result of their own political decisions (e.g. to disarm after the end of the cold war) rather than their lack of material or ideational capacities that could be transformed into military power.

Second, as to superpower behavior in a unipolar world, we need to distinguish clearly between hegemony and imperialism. *Hegemonic* power rests on the willingness of the superpower to sustain an international order, on its preparedness to commit itself to the rules of that order, and on the smaller states' acceptance of the order as legitimate. The latter is a function of the former, as a result of which small states gain "voice opportunities" to influence the hegemon's behavior, as Ikenberry has convincingly argued (Ikenberry 2000, 2001; for a neo-Gramscian version of this argument see Cox 1987). In contrast, *imperial* power still rests on the willingness of the superpower to sustain world order, but the main difference is that the superpower only plays by the rules of its own making when it suits its interests. In other words, imperial power is above the rules of the order, while the smaller states are subjected to them (Ikenberry 2002; see also Krell 2002). Of course, it is unlikely that small states consider such an order as legitimate and will, thus, play by its rules only reluctantly—hence the rising costs of maintaining the imperial order for the superpower. As structural realists would argue, imperial and revisionist powers will sooner or later invite a counter-alliance to balance their power (Mearsheimer 2001).

Unipolarity as a structural condition of the international system does not tell us whether we live in a hegemonic or an imperial order. Moreover (and this is Kagan's misunderstanding of neorealism), even if the United States lives in a Hobbesian world (I show below that the world view of those who favor American unilateralism, is anything but Hobbesian), the behavioral consequences of this world for its foreign policy are indeterminate—hegemony or imperial power? Yet, for allies and for the sustainability of the transatlantic alliance, it makes all the difference in the world whether they are ruled by a hegemonic or by an imperial power. U.S. hegemony and leadership has been readily accepted by the European allies throughout the post-World War II period. U.S. imperialism, however, could, indeed, lead to the end of the transatlantic partnership and would have to be maintained by the use of U.S. power against its allies in the long run. Be this

as it may, the crucial point is that we need to look inside the United States itself in order to explain whether it behaves like a benign hegemon or more like a malign imperialist. In other words, domestic politics and domestic structures are central to understanding U.S. foreign policy, even if we accept the realist assumptions about the structure of the international system.

A final argument against the claim that the current transatlantic crisis stems from U.S. unipolarity concerns directly the new security threats. It makes no sense to argue, on the one hand, that trans-national terrorist networks represent an immediate threat to the survival of highly industrialized societies *and* to claim, on the other hand, that the U.S. preponderance in the world system does not require allies. September 11, 2001 demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S. society (and of all highly industrialized democracies) vis-à-vis terrorist threats. If the accumulation of power resources is ultimately about securing one's survival in a Hobbesian world, as realists would argue, U.S. unipolarity was rather ineffective in responding to the new terrorist threat of the twenty-first century. Rather, 9/11 should serve as a reminder that even the world's only superpower needs allies to "hack networks of terror" (Deibert and Stein 2002).[2]

September 11, 2001, and the Rise of Transnational Terrorism

This brings me to the claim that 9/11 and the reactions to it constitute a watershed in the transatlantic relationship. If this means that differences in domestic responses to transnational terrorist threats result in transatlantic conflicts over the means of handling the threat, then there is some truth to it. If it means that the transatlantic community as such is endangered because of 9/11, the argument makes no sense. On the contrary, the transatlantic alliance faces a new threat that endangers the survival of highly industrialized, democratic states precisely because transnational terrorist networks exploit the vulnerabilities of open and liberal societies (Schneckener 2002; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Deibert and Stein 2002). As a result, increased transatlantic cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement is necessary and should, in turn, strengthen alliance cohesion. [At least, 9/11 as reflecting a structurally new phenomenon in world politics turns out to be indeterminate with regard to its consequences for the transatlantic alliance.]

In sum, neither the end of the cold war, U.S. unipolarity, nor the new threats of terrorist networks constitute changes in world politics that spell the end of the transatlantic community as such. These processes are indeterminate with regard to their consequences for the U.S.-European relationship. If we want to understand the current transatlantic problems, we have to look at domestic political developments on either side of the Atlantic. These developments lead to differences in perceptions and foreign policy outlooks that then challenge the transatlantic relationship. But first, let me briefly comment on the social structure of the transatlantic relationship.

The Transatlantic Alliance: A Liberal Security Community

Debates about U.S. foreign policy, unipolarity, and the transatlantic relationship usually overlook the obvious fact that the western world consists of liberal and capitalist democracies.[3] Enduring liberal democracies rarely fight each other and, therefore, the security dilemma is almost absent in their interactions with one another. The literature about "democratic peace" is enormous and the proposition does not require further elaboration (see, e.g., Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; Owen 1997; for reviews see Chan 1997; Elman 1999). Recent quantitative studies suggest

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[2] It should be noted, though, that the U.S. National Security Strategy does recognize the need for allies in the global fight against terrorism. See President of the United States 2002, 5-7.

[3] This part of the paper summarizes Risse 2002. For those interested in international relations theory: the following is based on social constructivist reasoning about international affairs, namely the insight that our interpretations of the world in which we live and our intersubjective understandings about it are crucially relevant in understanding world affairs.

that economic interdependence measured in trade dependence of GDP and joint membership in international organizations (IOs) also contribute to peaceful relations among states (Russett and Oneal 2001). Interdependence effects and IO membership are apparently not as robust as the consequences of joint democracy, but they contribute to the absence of war among states.

Joint democracy, economic interdependence, and highly institutionalized international relations—these are empirical indicators for what Karl W. Deutsch called a "pluralistic security community" already in 1957, defined as "a group of people that has become 'integrated.' By 'integration' we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population." The sense of community is defined as "mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling,' trust, and consideration; of at least partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of the ability to predict each other's behavior and the ability to act in accordance of that prediction" (Deutsch and al. 1957, 5-6, 9). A security community constitutes a particular social structure of international relations which then generates peaceful relations among the members (see also Adler and Barnett 1998b).

Inside a stable security community, behavior that may be perceived as highly dangerous and worth a response if it came from states outside the community is not regarded as threatening. The United States, for example, has never been concerned about British and French nuclear weapons of mass destruction, even though "objectively" they could inflict heavy damage on the U.S. mainland. Europeans and Japanese might strongly disagree with U.S. attempts to change the ABM Treaty, and with its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to sign the international treaty banning landmines, join the regime against climate change, and to go to war against Iraq. They might feel annoyed by American unilateralism. But none of this is seen as a military security threat to the other democratic powers in the contemporary international system giving rise to balancing behavior or to building counter-alliances.

But what explains the expectations of peaceful change among members of a security community? Three factors—"three Is"—mutually reinforce each other and serve to account for the democratic peace in the contemporary security community of major powers (see also Adler and Barnett 1998a; Barnett and Adler 1998):
1. collective identity;
2. stable and interdependent interactions across societies creating strong social interests in each other's well-being;
3. strong institutionalization of relationships creating social order and enduring norms among the members of the community.

Collective Identity

Among the three factors, collective identity is probably the most difficult to measure without getting into tautological reasoning (members of security communities do not fight each other; therefore, they must identify which each other which explains their peacefulness). To measure the strength of collective identities, we should distinguish them along two dimensions: the salience of the "self/other" or "in-group/out-group" distinction, on the one hand, and the price people are prepared to pay for their sense of loyalty to the group, on the other. As to the "in-group/ out-group" distinction, democratic security communities usually score rather high in this regard. Liberal democracies hold what Giesen and Eisenstadt called a "sacred" identity construction (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). We are the "shining city on the hill" (to quote from the American collective mythology; similar self-descriptions can easily be found in French discourses), though others can convert and become part of us, i.e., liberal democracies. Liberal security communities engage in rather strong boundary constructions along the "self/other" divide, which is a function of a country's internal order. Once states democratize, they are eligible as members of the security community. The sharp "self/other" distinction explains, e.g., the missionary impulse in American

foreign policy. It also explains why non-democracies are often constructed as "evil empires" and why autocratic leaders are often demonized (cf. the comparisons of both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic with Adolf Hitler, as well as the description of Osama bin Laden as the "personification of evil").

Moreover, there are sufficient examples to sustain the argument that the often-proclaimed "community of values" of the western alliance does not simply represent sheer rhetoric. After all, the United States prepared itself to sacrifice New York for Berlin during the cold war. The hot debates about the credibility of extended deterrence during the cold war document that this was not regarded as an empty threat. And in the post-cold war era, the Western security community did fight for its principles several times, from the Gulf war to the war in Kosovo. While there are material interest-based explanations for the Gulf war, the Kosovo war and the transformation of most of former Yugoslavia into a western protectorate can hardly be explained on material grounds. Rather, the liberal identity of the community and its commitment to humanitarian principles accounts to a large extent why western powers agreed to spend quite substantial economic, military, and human resources in the Balkans.

It is hard to measure collective identity on the basis of public opinion polls, particularly in the transatlantic area. Moreover, one needs to be careful not to confuse support for each other's foreign policies with collective identification. All public opinion polls agree that most Europeans disagree sharply with the Bush administration's foreign policy (see e.g. The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002; The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2001; The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2002). Since one can easily disagree with Bush's policies, but still like the United States, it is far more complicated to infer from these data the state of the transatlantic community in terms of collective identification with each other. "Anti-Americanism" is not on the rise simply because people in European reject American foreign policy.

On the contrary, opinion poll data confirm a remarkable degree of transatlantic consensus with regard to mutual sympathy for each other, threat perceptions, and support for a multilateral world order. While Europeans regard the United States less favorably in 2002 than in 1999/2000, more than two thirds still hold a positive image of America. The same holds true for American feelings toward major European allies (Worldviews 2002 2002). While the German view of the United States has declined sharply by 17 percent, 61 percent continue to see the United States in favorable terms (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002), 4). Large majorities of European public opinion even hold American popular culture in very high esteem (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002, 66). However, while western Europeans and Canadians are divided on whether or not American ideas about democracy should be viewed positively, large majorities of up to 71 percent (France) object to the diffusion of American ideas and customs (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002, 63-64). West European opinion leaders see the appeal of democratic ideals, America as the "land of opportunity," and U.S. technological and scientific advances as the main reasons why people like the United States. At the same time, resentment of U.S. power and the U.S. inability to close the gap between the rich and the poor in the world are seen as the main reasons why people dislike the United States (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2001, 2).

In sum, there is still strong sympathy for the United States, while specific aspects of the "American way of life" are rejected or at least viewed with some ambivalence. It is unclear, however, what constitutes the "American values" that Europeans resent. According to the University of Michigan's World Values Survey, Europeans and Americans strongly share so-called liberal "self-expression" values including support for democracy and gender equality. However, European in general score much higher than Americans on so-called "secular-rational" values, whereas a majority of Americans cling to "traditional-religious" values (quoted from *The Economist* 2003, 20).

Threat perceptions in Europe and the United States are still remarkably similar. Crime and terrorism are considered the top national problems on both sides of the Atlantic (with the exception

of Britain where only 23 percent consider terrorism as a "very big" problem). Europeans and Americans also agree that religious and ethnic hatred constitutes one of the greatest dangers in the world, while U.S. citizens seem to be somewhat more concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons than their European counterparts. Even the Iraq under Saddam Hussein is almost unanimously viewed as a threat on either side of the Atlantic. There is even agreement that Saddam Hussein should be removed from power (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002, 3, 32, 48; see also Worldviews 2002, 9). The issue of contention is not the threat perception, but how to respond to it. Here, the gap between the two sides of the Atlantic is increasing (see below).

Finally, and perhaps most significantly in light of the current transatlantic disputes, it is simply wrong that American citizens have become Hobbesians after 9/11, while Europeans remain Kantians (or Wilsonians, whatever you prefer), as Kagan claims. Support for multilateral institutions is equally high in western Europe as in the United States, and these data have remained stable for a long period of time (Krell 2002, 7; Worldviews 2002; Holsti 1996; Holsti 2001). This is particularly true concerning support for the United Nations, which continues to remain the sole legitimizing institution for the use of military force in the eyes of the public on both sides of the Atlantic. Perhaps Americans *and* Europeans are still Kantians or Wilsonians at heart.

In sum, it is hard to construct a widening gap in the overall world views, general foreign policy outlook and a strong decline in mutual sympathy and we-feeling between Americans and Europeans. People outside the United States, including Europeans, might resent what they perceive as American missionary zeal and American arrogance. But continuity remains overall stronger than change—despite 9/11 and the new threats of terrorism. It is equally wrong to construct a growing anti-Americanism among Europeans even though favorable views of the United States have declined somewhat in 2002. This latter effect might be the result of negative attitudes toward the Bush administration's foreign policy. It is the evaluation of the Bush administration's foreign policy where U.S. and European public opinion differs sharply. Yet, once again, policy disagreements as such do not challenge the sense of a transatlantic community demonstrated by the data presented above.

Transnational Interdependence

As to the second and third factors contributing to security communities, they can be measured more easily. If we measure economic interdependence as a proxy for transnational interdependence in general, the transatlantic community is alive and kicking. Combined indicators for trade, foreign investment, and capital flows show that the transatlantic region is highly integrated economically and is only surpassed by the EU's single market itself. In 1999, 45.2 percent of all U.S. foreign investment went to Europe, while 60.5 percent of all European foreign investment went to the United States. European investments in Texas alone are higher than all Japanese investments in the United States combined. Moreover, intra-firm trade constitutes a large chunk of transatlantic trade. EU subsidiaries of U.S. companies import more than one third of all U.S. exports to the EU, while U.S. subsidiaries of EU companies import more than two fifths of all EU exports to the United States. Six million jobs on each side of the Atlantic depend on transatlantic economic relations (data according to Krell 2002, 9).

In sum, the transatlantic market is highly integrated and remains so despite the ups and downs in the political relationship. The United States and the EU not only constitute each other's most important economic partners, but they are also the two leading world economic powers. As a result, the current international economic order is largely guaranteed and stabilized by the transatlantic economic relationship. One should not overemphasize the community-building impact of social interactions, however. To a certain degree, collective identities and material interests reinforce each other. Yet interdependence based on regular and frequent interactions does not necessarily lead to greater cooperation; it actually also instigate conflicts. Neoliberal institutionalism started from the assumption that international cooperation and regime-building are necessary to overcome economic

conflicts resulting from increased interdependence (Keohane 1989). In other words, the United States and the EU together are largely responsible for maintaining the contemporary liberal economic world order based on multilateralism and dispute settlement mechanisms establishing the rule of law.

<u>Multilateral Institutions</u>

This leads to the third factor constituting a security community, multilateral institution building. While frequent transactions among states and societies might lead to disputes, they also increase the mutual interests in peaceful resolution of those conflicts through international institutions and regimes. Again, and in parallel to the density of transnational interdependence, Europe and the transatlantic region constitute the most tightly coupled institutionalized settings within the larger security community. This region of the world also hosts the two strongest political, economic, and security institutions, in terms of robustness of norms, rules, and decision-making procedures: the EU and NATO. The multilateral institutions of the transatlantic community serve to manage the inevitable conflicts inside a security community. Moreover, norms and decision-making procedures of the international institutions governing the relationship embody the collective identity and shared values of the security community. As I argued elsewhere, "(d)emocracies are then likely to form *democratic institutions* whose rules and procedures are oriented toward consensual and compromise-oriented decision-making respecting the equality of the participants" (Risse-Kappen 1995, 33). Strong procedural norms of mutual consultation and policy coordination ensure that the members of the community have regular input and influence on each other's policymaking processes. These procedural norms and regulations are among the major tools mitigating power asymmetries among community members. Of course, one cannot deny that these asymmetries exist, particularly between the U.S., on the one hand, and the rest of the community, on the other, and that they affect outcomes.

Of course, these "voice opportunities" (Ikenberry 2001) suffer the more U.S. foreign policy pursues a unilateralist course or falls victim to "imperial ambitions" (Ikenberry 2002). U.S. unilateralism violates the fundamental norm of multilateralism that is constitutive for the transatlantic community. If unilateral tendencies that have always been a temptation in American foreign policy become the prevailing practice, then the transatlantic security community's constitutive norms are endangered, indeed. If the discourse emanating from Washington to abandon its multilateral alliances and to conclude temporary "alliances of the willing" to deal with international problems becomes the dominant practice, this would lead to a fundamental crisis of the transatlantic community.

Yet the typical response of European and other lesser members of the community to perceived U.S. arrogance and unilateral impulses has been to tighten the norms of the community in the various institutional settings. In other words, the strategy has typically been one of binding rather than balancing. Binding strategies, however, can only be effective if one believes that institutions affect behavior and preferences. Binding constitutes an institutionalist response to perceived unilateralism. It is along these lines that European countries and Japan have dealt with crises in their relations with the United States for most of the post-World War II period and they continue to do so.

In sum, if we use the "three Is"—identity, interdependence, institutions—as indicators for the state of the transatlantic security community, we get a rather precise picture of its current situation. While the collective identification with each other seems to have declined slightly in 2002, the basis of common values and shared principles is still intact on the level of both elites and mass public opinion. The transatlantic economic interdependence remains equally strong. Current challenges to the community mostly concern its institutions, including the constitutive norms on which they are based. Growing U.S. unilateralism and imperial ambitions violate fundamental community norms and, thus, give rise to increased transatlantic conflicts. To understand the sources of these conflicts,

however, we need to open up the black box of the states on both sides of the Atlantic and look at domestic politics.

IT'S DOMESTIC POLITICS, STUPID!
THE SOURCES OF CURRENT TRANSATLANTIC DISPUTES

If we want to understand the current transatlantic troubles, we need to look at domestic politics on either side of the Atlantic. First, however, I use opinion poll data in order to analyze what it is precisely that Europeans and Americans seem to disagree about. While public opinion in Europe and the United States still agrees on the fundamentals of the relationship, the cleavage concerns the evaluation of current U.S. foreign policy. Large majorities in public opinion reject the Bush administration's foreign policy; approval ratings varied from just 32 percent in France to 44 percent in Italy—in contrast to 69 percent in the United States in April 2002. Interestingly enough, however, Bush's foreign policy image has improved in Europe after 9/11, as much as it has in the United States—though at far lower levels (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2002, 1). Behind the negative attitude toward the Bush administration are three issues of transatlantic contention:

1. The use of military force as the primary means to settle perceived threats to national security. This is exemplified by opinion poll data concerning Iraq. While Europeans and Americans agree that the Iraqi leadership constitutes a threat to international security, U.S. citizens support using force to remove Saddam Hussein, while large majorities of Europeans are opposed (the British are almost evenly split; see The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002, 3).
2. While transnational terrorism is seen as a major threat to international security on both sides of the Atlantic, Europeans tend to view the issue as one of (transnational) law enforcement and crime prevention. The Bush administration immediately framed the issue as a "war on terrorism" and this quickly became the dominant discourse in the United States. Not so in Europe; one almost never hears a European politician talking about transnational terrorism in terms that imply a military response as a primary way to deal with the problem (see also Katzenstein 2002). Bush's "axis of evil" rhetoric seems to fly with American citizens, while majorities between 55 percent and 74 percent in Europe reject it (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2002, 2).
3. Not surprisingly, American unilateralism is almost universally rejected outside the United States. Seventy-three percent of the Germans, 80 percent of the French, and even 73 percent of the British agree that the United States only takes its own interests into account in the fight against terrorism (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2002, 3). If there is an imperial temptation in current U.S. foreign policy, it strongly undercuts support for American goals outside the United States. One has to note, though, that unilateralism is *not* a source of tension between U.S. and European public opinion, but, rather, between Europeans—leaders and masses alike—on the one hand, and members of the current U.S. government, on the other. The American public still supports multilateralism—in agreement with Europeans (see above; Worldviews 2002 2002).

In sum, the current transatlantic dispute is about U.S. unilateralism combined with what is perceived as an excessive use of military force to counter threats to international security. President Bush's rhetoric surely does not help in this regard. In fact, it makes matters worse, since U.S. foreign policy continues to be far more pragmatic than its sometimes-militant rhetoric. To some extent, one is reminded of the transatlantic tensions during the times of the first Reagan administration in the early 1980s (see Kubbig 1988; Risse-Kappen 1988; Talbott 1984). While George W. Bush is widely perceived as a unilateralist president in Europe, Ronald Reagan was seen

as abandoning nuclear arms control in a similar fashion. Compare also the "evil empire" rhetoric of Ronald Reagan with Bush's "axis of evil."

The Domestic Side of U.S. Foreign Policy

These similarities run deeper than perceptions in public opinion, however. Most importantly, U.S. foreign policy is currently controlled by a domestic coalition whose world views are quite different from the dominant European foreign policy coalitions. Let me start with U.S. foreign policy. It is currently run by two competing groups holding strikingly similar world views to the prevailing and equally competing domestic coalitions during Reagan's first term (on the latter see in particular Talbott 1984, 1988; Kubbig 1988). During the early 1980s, a neo-conservative group that hated détente and arms control and despised the "whimpy" European allies was largely in control of the Pentagon. Some members of this group, such as Richard Perle, have returned and are members of the current Bush administration. Now, as then, this group is composed of devoted militant internationalists preferring American unilateralism to entangling alliances. They could be called "Jacksonians"—as opposed to isolationist "Jeffersonians," liberal and pacifist "Wilsonians," and realist "Hamiltonians" (on these distinct groups in the history of U.S. foreign policy see Mead 2001; for a brilliant analysis see Hassner 2002). During the early 1980s, neo-conservatives were convinced that arms control had to be abandoned in favor of arms racing in order to ruin the Soviet economy and, thus, to win the cold war. Twenty years later, this group believes in the "unipolar moment" as a unique opportunity for the United States to (re-) create international order following an American design. Their "imperial ambition" (Ikenberry 2002) is prepared to accept temporary alliances, but their fundamental beliefs reject stable partnerships, such as the transatlantic community, as too entangling to suit U.S. interests. In other words, this group of neo-conservatives rejects the principles upon which the security community between the United States and Europe has been built.

There is one big difference, however, in the world views expressed by American neo-conservatives of the Reagan years compared to those in the Bush administration. The "Jacksonians" or internationalist hawks of the Bush administration are much more prepared to use American power to promote liberal values and to construct a world order based on liberal democracies, universal human rights, and American-style capitalism. Hassner has aptly called this "Wilsonianism in boots," analogous to Napoleon's "revolution in boots" (Hassner 2002, 43). The American neo-conservatives of the Bush administration are certainly not Hobbesians in their world view, as their fellow conservative Kagan wants us to believe (Kagan 2002). Their Leviathan has a distinctly liberal, albeit militant, vision of world order. These militant *and* liberal unilateralists occupy the civilian leadership in the Pentagon, including the Secretary of Defense, and they have the ear of the Vice President. They are backed, at least temporarily, by strong economic interests, including the oil and defense industries.

The neo-conservatives of the early Reagan era as well as the current Bush administrations have been balanced domestically and bureaucratically by a more traditional conservative group whose world views closely resemble classical realist "Hamiltonianism." Officials such as Richard Burt, Paul Nitze, and George Shultz in the early 1980s, Bush senior's foreign policy team of the late 1980s, as well as Colin Powell in the current Bush administration see the world in more realist terms. While they certainly share liberal values, they are not Wilsonians in the sense of supporting a multilateral liberal world order. But they resent the "imperial ambition" of the unilateralists and are convinced that the United States cannot go it alone—even in a unipolar system. At the same time, this group is rather skeptical of the nation-building implications that the neo-conservatives' liberal visions imply. Today as well as twenty years ago, this group has remained deeply committed to the transatlantic security community. With a little help from their European friends, the traditional conservatives succeeded in gradually moving Ronald Reagan toward the resumption of nuclear arms control—and in having George W. Bush go to the United Nations to seek support for his Iraq

policy. As to the Bush administration, Powell's fellow conservatives at the State Department are supported by the disgruntled U.S. military (see Hassner 2002, 28-33, also Holsti 1998/99), on the one hand, and—not to be overlooked—by the foreign policy establishment in the U.S. Senate—from Richard Lugar to Joseph Biden.

From the beginning of the Bush administration, a tug-of-war between the neo-conservatives and the traditional conservatives characterized the foreign policy decision-making process in Washington. The President himself was not known at the time for favoring the liberal vision of the neo-conservatives, even though U.S. foreign policy had already become more unilateralist than during the Clinton administration. In particular, the Bush administration abandoned most efforts at seeking multilateral solutions for the world's most urgent problems—from the international environment (Kyoto Protocol and biodiversity convention) to human rights (International Criminal Court; women's reproductive rights) to conventional as well as nuclear arms control (small arms trafficking, landmines, ABM treaty; see the list in Krell 2002, 14-16). Then came September 11, 2001, and the attack against the U.S. homeland by transnational terrorism. September 11 and the understandable shock and sense of vulnerability it generated among Americans had profound consequences for the domestic balance of power in U.S. foreign policy. It created a policy window of opportunity for neo-conservative policy entrepreneurs such as Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary of Defense. As a result, the domestic balance of power in the United States changed in favor of the neo-conservative group whose liberal vision, including "Wilsonianism in boots," was increasingly shared by the President. The president's popularity in a time of perceived existential threat and the "rallying 'round the flag" effect in public opinion overshadowed the fact that the currently dominant coalition in U.S. foreign policy is out of sync with the American public (see data above).

The Presidential "National Security Strategy" of September 2002 and the new focus on Iraq constitute expressions of the new domestic balance of power in Washington. Nevertheless, both examples also show that neo-conservative unilateralists have not (yet) taken control of U.S. foreign policy, but have to make concessions to the traditional conservatives and their allies in Congress and in Europe. As to the "National Security Strategy" document, for example, it clearly expresses a liberal vision of world politics:[4] "Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world" (President Bush in President of the United States 2002, V). Incorporating the foreign policy views of the neo-conservatives, the document commits the United States:

- to pre-emptive, if not preventive warfare against terrorism and "rogue states" with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- to unilateralism "when our interests and unique responsibilities require" (President of the United States 2002, 31);
- to military superiority "to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States" (ibid., 30).

None of these statements, as such, are entirely new. However, it is the combination of a liberal vision with unilateral action "if necessary" (but who decides?) that represents quite a shift from previous foreign policy strategies of the United States. If unilateralist liberalism were to become the dominant practice of U.S. foreign policy, it would seriously challenge the transatlantic security community. Yet the document also contains quite a few paragraphs expressing the standard

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[4] It is quite interesting in this context that the document has been widely reported as Condoleezza Rice's work. In the past, Rice has usually been identified as sharing the realist outlook of the traditional conservatives rather than the liberal unilateralism of the neo-conservatives.

repertoire of the traditional conservatives, such as the commitment to NATO, the EU, and other allies. It also commits the United States to active engagement in regional crises and to a substantial increase in foreign aid. Finally, and significantly, the United States remains committed to a multilateral and liberal international economic order. This latter point is often overlooked in Europe, but it is of utmost importance for the future of world order. In sum, the much-criticized "National Security Strategy" document actually represents a policy compromise between the neo-conservative unilateralists and the traditional conservatives in the Bush administration.

Interestingly enough, the same holds true for the Iraq policy, at least so far. As to Iraq, the neo-conservative group in the administration managed to get "regime change" on the political agenda of the Bush administration and to put the Iraq question back on the international agenda, against the previous consensus that the containment strategy had actually worked (see Mearsheimer and Walt 2003). Yet, a counter-coalition composed of the traditional conservatives inside and outside the Bush administration, on the one hand, and (mostly European) U.S. allies, on the other, managed to change the focus from "regime change" to the issue of weapons of mass destruction and to persuade the president to go through the United Nations Security Council. While the final outcome of the crisis is unclear, and while the unilateralists might still carry the day, nevertheless events since the summer of 2002 show that so far the neo-conservatives have failed to assume control of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the combination of electoral politics and the state of the U.S. economy are likely to push the president back towards the center of public opinion.

The Domestic Side of European Foreign Policy

While the dominant coalition in charge of U.S. foreign policy is composed of neo-conservatives (liberal unilateralists) and traditional conservatives (realists with a preference for traditional alliances), the dominant coalitions running the EU's foreign policy as well as the foreign policies of the most important member states look rather different (see the following figure).

Dominant Foreign Policy Coalitions in the U.S. and Europe

12

The figure on page 12 depicts the dominant coalitions on both sides of the Atlantic in a two-dimensional space. A third dimension which is often used to depict foreign policy attitudes—isolationism vs. internationalism—is omitted here, since the dominant foreign policy elites in the United States and Europe share a commitment to internationalism. There are few "Jeffersonians" on either side of the Atlantic. Rather, the various groups differ from each other with regard to:

1. a *"realist-liberal"* continuum (y-axis) which depicts whether people view the world in realist terms and, thus, security interests dominate their vision of foreign policy, or whether they are primarily committed to the promotion of a liberal vision, i.e. the spread of human rights, democracy, and market economy;
2. a *"unilateral/militant-multilateral/cooperative"* continuum (x-axis) depicting whether foreign policy-makers favor unilateralism and the use for force to promote foreign policy goals or whether they support a cooperative foreign policy working with and through multilateral institutions.

European foreign policy elites can roughly be divided in two groups. First, the European center-left shares with American neo-conservatives a commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights as their foreign policy priorities. In sharp contrast to the U.S. radical right, however, this group is equally and firmly committed to a cooperative foreign policy and to work with and through multilateral institutions. This group, which is currently in charge of German foreign policy, pursues the foreign policy of a "civilian power" (Maull 1990; Harnisch and Maull 2001), and thus shares a Kantian vision of world order in the true sense of the "perpetual peace," i.e., building a pacific federation of democratic states and strengthening the rule of law in international affairs (Kant 1795/1983). European Kantians are not pacifists; they do support the use of military force if necessary (remember that Chancellor Schröder put the survival of his governing coalition on the line concerning the war in Afghanistan). Yet military power has to be embedded in political and diplomatic efforts, and unilateralism is anathema for the European center-left.

Second, the European center-right holds a more realist view of the world than either the American neo-conservatives or the European center-left, or, to be more precise, this group's liberal convictions are balanced by concerns about more traditional security issues. In this sense, the European conservatives hold views similar to the traditional conservatives in the United States. At the same time, however, the group is almost as committed to a multilateral and cooperative foreign policy as the center-left, even though it remains less critical regarding the use of military force and considers it a more normal instrument of foreign policy. The current French government under President Chirac probably comes closer to the world views expressed by the European center-right as well as, ironically, the British Labor government under Prime Minister Tony Blair. The different views on Iraq notwithstanding, the world views of the British and French elites in charge of the foreign policies of their countries are actually pretty similar, as far as the combination of realist outlook and support for cooperative multilateralism is concerned.

Whether or not the British ultimately join an American war against Iraq, the two dominant groups in European foreign policy are united in rejecting U.S. unilateralism as promoted by neo-conservatives in the Bush administration. The more the United States moves in this direction, the more we are going to see a continuation of the current transatlantic troubles, and the more this will hamper the necessity to combine forces in the fight against transnational terrorism—a threat perception shared on both sides of the Atlantic.

But can one even talk of "European foreign policy" in a meaningful sense? If we follow the dominant discourse on both sides of the Atlantic, the answer is no: take the cacophony of voices concerning the Iraq crisis, from the German (no longer so) unconditional "no" to war, to the French "no, but" to the British "yes, but." Yet the conventional wisdom overlooks significant changes in the institutional makeup of Europe and the EU over the past fifteen years. On the one hand, the EU

is no state with an army and a defense budget. Military security issues are still largely in the hands of nation-states and subject to consensual voting in the European Council of Ministers and the committees of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). But even the EU's military role is gradually changing, as can be seen in Macedonia. In addition, the European constitutional Treaty that is currently being prepared by the Convention will probably strengthen European foreign and security policy institutions quite substantially.

On the other hand, and more importantly, the EU does speak with one voice in almost all other matters of foreign policy. This concerns external economic policy that falls under the EU Commission's exclusive competences, and it encompasses security issues such as conflict prevention and resolution as well as peace-keeping. Finally, the EU's common foreign policy concerns questions of the international environment, international human rights, and most arms control and disarmament issues. As to the latter, it is often overlooked that the EU has had a joint nuclear non-proliferation policy in place for more than twenty years (Müller 1991). Part of Europe's foreign policy still requires intergovernmental consensus, but supranational actors such as the Commission have substantially increased their impact over the past fifteen years (for a detailed and comprehensive analysis see Gegout 2003).

In sum, the conventional wisdom is simply wrong that there is no European foreign policy to speak of. Moreover, and partly resulting from the peculiar institutional arrangements including the competences of the European Commission, the emerging EU foreign policy very much resembles that of a "civilian power" and, thus, of the world views of the European center-left as described above. The EU foreign policy is committed to strengthening multilateral institutions, including the construction of legal norms in world affairs (see Keohane 2002). Its record in the promotion of human rights, of peace-building and conflict prevention as well as the protection of the international environment—in sum, in most "global governance" questions—is second to none in world politics (on human rights, see Hazelzet 2001). One can dismiss this as the foreign policy of the weak—the United States has to take care of the international 911 emergency calls (Kagan 2002). EU foreign policy looks different from a more sophisticated perspective of international affairs in the twenty-first century—if one acknowledges that the root causes of transnational terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and other current security threats are the lack of democracy, human rights, and social justice in the crises regions of the world. Interestingly enough, these are precisely the challenges of global security identified by the U.S. "National Security Strategy" document—and Europe is responding to them.

Thus the current transatlantic conflicts have to be explained by differences in the world views of the dominant foreign policy elites in charge in the United States as compared to Europe. The Bush administration's foreign policy has to be accounted for by shifts in the power balance between neo-conservative liberal unilateralists ("Wilsonians with boots"), on the one hand, and traditional conservatives who want to preserve America's alliances, on the other. In contrast, European foreign policy is run by coalitions of liberal multilateralists—the European center-left, on the one hand, and more realist multilateralists—the European center-right, on the other. As a result, the clash between the United States and Europe is not so much about liberal values and not even about the use of force if necessary, but about unilateralism versus multilateralism. The more the Bush administration takes unilateral action, the more it will find itself isolated from its allies and the more the transatlantic security community will experience crises.

CONCLUSIONS: EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO AMERICAN UNILATERALISM

My argument in this paper can be summarized as follows. The transatlantic security community is still intact if measured by the "three Is,"—identities, interdependence, institutions. But recent U.S.-European conflicts do challenge some of its fundamentals. These conflicts stem from domestic developments on both sides of the Atlantic leading to different perceptions of contemporary

security threats and, more importantly, different prescriptions on how to handle them. Such differences have existed before and they have been dealt with through the institutions of the transatlantic community including European use of domestic access opportunities into the U.S. political system. Yet, unilateral and even imperial tendencies in contemporary U.S. foreign policy violate some constitutive norms on which the transatlantic community has been based for more than fifty years. They also touch upon fundamentals concerning world order and the rule of (international) law in dealing with international conflicts. American neo-conservatives are as committed as the European center-left to the global promotion of human rights and democracy, but they are also convinced that the unprecedented American power position in the world requires unilateral action to promote these goals, including the unilateral use of (preventive) force. In contrast, a strong European consensus favors a cooperative foreign policy geared to strengthening international institutions and the rule of international law. While American traditional conservatives are far less multilaterally oriented than their European counterparts on the center-right, they are nevertheless committed to at least preserving the transatlantic community.

What policy consequences follow from this assessment, particularly for European responses to America's "imperial ambitions?" I see two major corollaries. To begin with, if it is true that the social structure of the transatlantic relationship is still intact, then the traditional European reaction to U.S. unilateralist impulses remains valid. In the past, Europeans have usually responded to transatlantic conflicts by increased binding through strengthening the transatlantic institutional ties rather than counter-balancing. They have used the open U.S. domestic system for their purposes by successfully forming transnational and transgovernmental coalitions across the Atlantic in order to increase their leverage on American foreign policy (for evidence see Risse-Kappen 1995). I see no compelling reason why this strategy that worked well during the first Reagan administration with a similar domestic configuration of forces cannot be successfully employed today. Now and then, the natural allies of Europeans inside the administration and in Congress are the moderate conservatives who care about the transatlantic community. Moreover, European foreign policy can exploit the fact that American public opinion continues to hold views much closer to European outlooks than to those of the neo-conservatives inside and outside the administration. Using transnational ties into the U.S. political system has already worked in the case of Iraq, since it was the combined forces of allied and moderate conservative pressure that ultimately convinced the president to seek the UN route in the Iraq conflict.

However, it is important in this context that European voices are being heard loud and clear in Washington. While European governments should choose their battles with the U.S. administration carefully since they cannot fight simultaneously on all fronts, the "National Security Strategy" document deserves a common European response. Of course, one can argue that this response already exists in practice given the emerging European foreign policy focusing on human rights, democracy, and multilateralism. Yet, European practice has to be complemented by a European foreign policy discourse. The goal is not to weaken the institutional ties in the transatlantic community, but to strengthen similar voices inside the U.S. domestic system. Such a declared European foreign policy strategy would have to incorporate the following elements:

1. A clear expression of a *liberal vision of world order* based on the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and market economy. It would be disastrous to leave the liberal vision to American neo-conservatives and not to recognize that western foreign policy is first and foremost about promoting liberal values. This entails in particular that a European response is needed to the neoconservatives' political agenda of promoting democracy in the world's crises regions, particularly the Middle East (see Rudolf 2002, 8). A pro-active European foreign policy is needed in this regard.
2. An equally unambiguous commitment to *multilateralism and the rule of international law*. This is the characteristic feature and trademark of contemporary European foreign policy that

distinguishes a European foreign policy strategy from the vision articulated in the United States' "National Security Strategy." The point is that a liberal vision of world order cannot be promoted unilaterally without being inherently contradictory. If it is constitutive for domestic liberal orders that no one—not even the most powerful—is above the law, this is also true for a world order based on democratic principles. A liberal world order requires recognition of the rule of law as a constitutive feature—together with democracy and human rights. If this is Kantian, so be it! This is also the ultimate reason why European foreign policy must not give in to U.S. pressures concerning the International Criminal Court. The issue here is not about the protection of soldiers (one can always find solutions here), it is fundamentally about world order—and, therefore, about values governing a liberal community of states.

3. But Europe also has to articulate a clear strategy on the use of military force. The current transatlantic division of labor—the U.S. as the military fighting force and the world's policeman, Europe as the main provider of political nation-building and cleaning up afterwards—is not sustainable. Rather, European societies have to understand that the construction of a multilateral liberal world order is no fair-weather job but requires the use military force from time to time, albeit in a multilateral (UN) context and embedded in a political strategy of conflict resolution. Transnational terrorist networks and weapons of mass destruction are real threats to liberal societies that require not just political, but also military answers. Once again, it would be disastrous to let the use of military force be dictated by American unilateralists. Coming to grips with the use of military force and providing the necessary resources to sustain it is primarily a German problem, but it has repercussions for the rest of Europe.

The essence of the security community of democratic states over the past fifty years has been the commitment to a world order based on liberal principles and values as well as multilateralism. This is fundamentally why the Western community won the cold war. And it will be on the basis of these principles that the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be won.

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